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1 INTRODUCTION
This report describes the progress made at the Coordinated Science 
Laboratory in developing the conceptual machinery of a system for enhancing 
the safety of commercial f lig h t  operations. This system, placed on board an 
a irliner, would serve as an additional crew member by performing continuous 
monitoring o f  a l l  systems and would perform tasks delegated i t  by the p ilo t  
during periods o f heavy workload. Since the purpose o f this system is  to 
provide Safety Enhancement by Computer Reasoning, i t  has been named the SECURE 
system.
A study was made to delineate the functions for the SECURE system and to 
provide an in it ia l organization [1 ]. The emphasis is  in in telligen t 
monitoring. SECURE interprets the instrurrEnt outputs with respect to the
flig h t  phase and determines whether a system is  operating properly or whether 
an instrument is  defective.
The study also suggests that the SECURE system be constructed in a 
problem solving environment. This would allow the system to develop plans for 
recovering from system fa ilures or for operating in degraded modes. These 
plans could then be presented to the p ilo t  as suggestions which he may either 
accept or re ject based on his knowledge of the situation.
Finally, the study suggests that the SECURE system should alert the p ilo t  
to malfunctions in an in telligen t manner. For instance, on a clear day, 
during takeoff, i f  the radar fa ils  SECURE should not immediately report this 
fact to the p ilo t  because it  w ill be more a distraction than a help. It  is  
much better to notify the p ilo t  when the aircraft is  airborne and the p i lo t ’ s 
workload reduced. On the other hand, i f  v is ib il ity  were low on takeoff due to
2fog or rain, a faulty radar system should be reported imriBdiately to the p ilo t 
who may then decide to abort the takeoff.
In deciding what information to present to the p ilo t  during such times 
SECURE must have knowledge o f the relationships between the particular flig h t 
phase and the correct operation of each aircraft system. In determining the 
operational c r it ic a lity  of these systems, SECURE must take into account such 
factors as weather conditions, runway conditions and the p i lo t ’ s workload. A 
way for SECURE to  then decide what information to display would be to  create a 
l i s t  o f  p r ior ities  for the displaying o f  information about the instruments and 
aircraft systems. The p r io r it ie s  o f this display information would be updated 
as each new phase o f the flig h t  is  entered. SECURE then would display 
information whose priority  is  greater than a threshold value which is  set by 
the p ilo t  or which is established by some consensus o f p ilo ts .
In order for the SECURE system to establish display p rior ities  it  must 
have considerable knowledge about flig h t  procedures for each phase o f the 
flig h t. For in te lligen t monitoring i t  must have knowledge o f the flig h t 
p ro file , f lig h t  dynamics and the operating ranges o f each system for each 
phase o f the flig h t . In detecting and diagnosing fa ilu res, and in planning 
recoveries from fa ilures and flig h t  deviations, the SECURE system must have 
knowledge o f the function o f a l l  a ircraft systems so that it  can give a 
description o f the fault condition to the degree o f detail desired by the 
p ilo t . In general the SECURE system must have access to a large body of 
knowledge which contains information about a ll the aircraft systems, about 
energy management, about the flig h t  phases, about flig h t  procedures, about 
fa ilure recovery procedures and other information to aid the monitoring, 
planning and p ilo t alerting functions.
3Hence a knowledge base is  necessary for the successful operation o f the 
SECURE system. Much o f the work during the f ir s t  six months o f this project 
revolved about how to implement such a knowledge base. Three problems are 
inherent in establishing the knowledge base, namely:
1 . To determine precisely what information the knowledge base 
should contain.
2. To determine how this information should be represented.
3. To determine how this information is  to be used for the various 
monitoring and planning tasks.
The following pages o f this report describe the e fforts  to establish the 
knowledge base, and the concomitant development o f the conceptual framework 
for the SECURE system. Section 2 describes the results o f the investigations 
to date in the establishing o f  the knowledge base for the SECURE system. 
Section 3 then describes the efforts to  implement the SECURE system. Finally, 
Section 4 discusses the plans for the second half o f  the project.
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42 KNOWLEDGE BASE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SECURE SYSTEM
As part o f  the program for determining the information content o f the
knowledge base, three separate interviews were undertaken to learn from
commercial airline crew members their needs from the SECURE system. These 
interviews have greatly influenced the planning o f what functions SECURE 
should have, and consequently, the various types o f information which should 
be included in the knowledge base. The three interviews were held with
multiple je t  engine a ircra ft crew members including a National Guard p ilo t , a 
flig h t  engineer frcm American Airlines and six senior captains who f ly  wide 
body aircraft for United A irlines. I t  was generally agreed that the SECURE 
system should aid the p ilo t  and crew with monitoring tasks, i t  should verify  
the correctness o f instrument readings, i t  should perform some automatic
checklisting, i t  should propose fa ilure recovery procedures and i t  should 
inform the p ilo t  o f  d if f ic u lt ie s  at appropriate times. The following sections 
discuss the results o f the interviews and describe the types o f knowledge the 
SECURE system needs in order to accomplish these functions.
2.1 Results o f  the Crew Member Interviews
It  was clearly recognized by a ll those interviewed that there are many 
non -critica l f l ig h t  tasks and functions which a computer can perform more 
quickly, accurately, and e ff ic ie n t ly  than people. On a general level, these 
include instrument monitoring and record keeping, making routine calculations 
o f weather, energy-management, and navigational data, the storage of emergency 
and special procedures and aircraft specifications, and their retrieval on 
demand. These features can be implemented by a computer system in a
5straightforward manner so that, for instance, the flig h t  engineer can be 
relieved o f  much tedious and time-consuming instrument watching. Thus, he has 
more freedom to execute higher level functions such as watching for t ra ff ic . 
Accurate and permanent records o f the performance o f a l l  a ircraft components 
w ill become available, simplifying maintenance and forestalling malfunctions. 
The accuracy and quantity of weather data w ill be greatly increased, improving 
the generation o f  f l ig h t  plans, enhancing safety, and increasing fuel economy. 
A substantial beginning can be made to satisfy  the universally expressed need 
for assistance and information when entering a holding pattern. In addition, 
procedures required for dealing with emergencies w ill be more quickly and 
easily available whenever needed. This w ill help to counterbalance any
tendencies o f the crew to overreact during emergencies which occur very 
infrequently because o f  the increased r e lia b ility  of a ircra ft.
However, many additional functions for which a strong desire was
expressed, the elimination of false alarms, the lessening the workload o f  the 
crew in c r it ic a l  situations, the diagnosis o f the causes o f simple and
multiple fa ilu res, and the selection and ranking by priority of emergency and 
error-recovery procedures, require a considerably more sophisticated approach. 
It  would appear that the airborne computer system needs to be in telligen t, 
that is , to perform in a fashion which would be considered to require
intelligence i f  done by a person. I t  is here that the concepts o f a r t if ic ia l  
intelligence are most relevant, and they w ill be extensively applied in the 
design of this system. I t  has always been the intention of the designers to 
equip the system with program intelligence, and now, after these interviews, 
i t  is  clear that such a system would be enthusiastically welcomed by flig h t  
professionals also.
6For example, an in telligen t monitor could do much more than passively 
observe and record. I t  would be able to  extract from sensor data the same 
pragmatic information as the human crew does now, and do it  faster, more 
accurately, without fatigue, and in the presence o f obscuring complications. 
It  would communicate conclusions and sp ec ific , well-organized recomrrendations 
to the crew, not merely the raw, undigested data. I t  could make use o f 
automatic t ie -in  o f warning and recovery, or o f multipurpose displays, or a 
combination of both. In order to sound only true alarms and to ensure highly 
reliable responses, i t  should be sensitive to the phase o f the flig h t  and to 
the state o f the a ircra ft. Simple fixed priority  schemes are in su fficient.
For a discussion o f tools and methods and for more details about the 
functional requirements o f an in telligen t airborne computer system, the 
Coordinated Science Laboratory report o f  Morishige [1] should be consulted.
The need to update the data, especially weather and navigational data, 
stored in the computer, demonstrates the eventual need for a data link between 
the airborne computer system and ground based knowledge sources. The airborne 
system clearly needs access to at least the same information that is  used by 
the computer generating fl ig h t  plans. Topographic information about the 
terrain over which the a ircraft f l ie s ,  the actual flig h t  plan, the minimum 
equipment l is t  (MEL), and the configuration deviation l i s t  (CDL) can also be 
supplied via th is link. In the design of the system an implementation o f this 
data link capability w ill be assumed, for without it , many of the most wanted 
features cannot be provided. However, the system w ill s t i l l  be able to 
function without this link, though in a less than optimal fashion.
7All o f  the persons interviewed wanted to greatly increase the amount o f 
information that is  d irectly  available on board the a ircra ft . Hence, in 
addition to the real-time data from sensors and the data link, the airborne 
computer system w ill need to have a large knowledge base consisting o f 
aircraft specifica tions, special and emergency procedures, and other less 
easily categorized knowledge o f flig h t and flying. Even with special 
preformulated procedures on board and the ab ility  to determine when they are 
needed, not a l l  situations can be foreseen. The system w ill need to possess 
another feature o f intelligence -  the capability of generating new plans and 
procedures to deal with unexpected occurrences. I t  w ill also have to be able 
to  adnit fa ilu re and there may be times when it  w ill be the system, not the 
human crew, which needs help. The system w ill always remain open to the 
direction and advice o f  the crew, and w ill interrupt its  own activ ity , unless 
that is  determined to be extremely c r it ic a l ,  to aid them whenever requested.
The computer system w ill be designed to operate in the presence o f 
aircraft malfunctions and deficiencies. This is particularly important i f  a 
problem develops in flig h t , rather than being known in advance, as the crew 
and the system w ill not have the advance notice o f  the MEL or CDL. With this 
capability, the absence or fa ilu re o f the data link, the inertia l navigation 
system, or any other subsystem w ill simply mean that a d ifferent set o f system 
resources w ill be called into play. Failure o f  power to the computer would be 
a very serious malfunction. The system needs to fa i l  gracefully, and to 
resume operation with only minimal assistance when power is  restored. As 
fly ing without the computer system operational is a clear p oss ib ility , the 
crew must retain a l l  o f  their present competence.
8These interviews, especially the one with with the United Airlines 
captains, were highly productive of ideas and information. This kind o f  close 
cooperation between the research group and the potential users is needed to 
produce a truly workable system, namely, an in telligen t airborne computer 
system which is  trustworthy, cost-e ffe ctiv e , and convenient, and is  not a 
crutch. As this study proceeds, the system designers w ill continue to have 
interviews with f l ig h t  crews, maintaining a close liaison with the operational 
environment for the mutual benefit o f both sides. It  would be useful to 
follow the O’ Hare interview of senior Captains with an interview of younger 
crew members, especially those with an background in Engineering, in order to 
obtain another point o f view on the situations already discussed.
More detailed information is  needed concerning actual emergencies and 
other situations which entail postponement o f routine tasks. There are 
several types o f useful information in this area. One type concerns the 
circumstances which give rise  to these situations and the conditions under
which they are likely  to oocur. This knowledge, which can be obtained from
further interviews and o f f i c ia l  NSTB accident reports, w ill help the system to 
prevent and foresta ll d iff ic u lt ie s . A second kind o f information relates to 
what actually happens to the a ircraft systems in the mast common emergencies.
This data can be used as a basis for procedures that analyze the cause, or
causes, of problems. Then there are the procedures and methods actually used 
in practice to cope with these situations. The procedures contained in 
airline training manuals and films are a source being tapped for knowledge in 
this area, but the observation o f actual flig h t  simulator sessions would be a 
very valuable experience. In these, one has the opportunity to observe 
d irectly  what p ilots really do, not just what they claim they do, under 
conditions o f high workload and stress.
92.2 Knowledge Base Requirements for an Intelligent Monitor
The primary purpose o f the monitor is  to provide continuous, real-time 
information about the state o f the a ircraft and its  systems. The use o f a 
computer monitor can sign ificantly  reduce p ilo t  workload by relieving him of 
the tedious task of monitoring numerous instrument readings and mentally 
integrating the raw data to determine the overall systems performance. For 
example, engine performance is  now monitored by checking and correlating the 
indications for EGT, RPM, fuel flew, nozzle position, EPR, etc. Normally, i t  
would be much easier for  the p ilo t  to monitor a single thrust reading. The 
complete set o f parameters would be available to  the p ilo t  on request or 
automatically when needed.
I t  is  generally acknowledged that certain phases o f flig h t  are 
characterized by a high workload for the p ilo t  and crew. During high workload 
periods, the quality and quantity of the normal monitoring is  likely  to be 
diminished. Deviations are more likely  to go undetected for longer periods o f 
time. An unnoticed deviation can frequently compound the hazard o f  a high 
workload situation. The monitor would not be affected by the increased 
workload since it  w ill be designed to have excess capacity over peak load 
situations. Nor would the monitor be affected by typical human fa ilin gs such 
as boredom, fatigue, or fixation .
The in telligent monitor would require several supporting functions. The 
capabilities for the monitor should include the following:
1. Verification o f  sensor output.
2. Detection o f  deviations.
3. Diagnosis o f a common cause for  related sensor indications.
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4. Reporting diagnosis to  the executive for priority  resolution.
5. Automatic checklist presentation.
6. Generation o f  a history o f deviations and significant events for 
later analysis.
7. Real-time response
8. Degraded mode operation
The basic sequence o f operations for the monitor should probably follow 
the steps below.
1. Sensors provide direct information about the state o f the 
aircraft and its  systems. A ll sign ificant measurable parameters 
are sensed.
2. The sensor readings are verified  for log ica l consistency. Any 
sensor indication which is  not consistent is  given a lower 
p lausib ility  and is  so reported.
3. The verified  sensor readings are compared against a context 
sensitive model for agreement.
4. A diagnosis is made based upon the deviations to determine i f  
there is  a probable common cause.
5. Any diagnosis and the supporting evidence (sensor indications) 
are reported to the executive for relay to the p ilo t  and 
recorded for later analysis.
2.2.1 Determination o f the Normal State
The normal state o f  a system may depend upon the context o f the a ircra ft. 
The phase-based context is  often reflected in the crew checklist where 
different modes are specified for different phases o f flig h t . For example, 
during landing and takeoff the position of the landing gear should be down, 
but during cruise, the position should be up and locked. Besides 
configuration, other examples o f systems where parameters are sensitive to the
11
phase o f flig h t  are pressurization, the fuel system, and navigation. The 
in telligen t computer system can determine the normal state o f  some parameters 
by the use o f scripts. Flight plan information w ill also provide reference 
information on planned fuel quantity, route o f  f l ig h t , cruise speeds, etc. to 
monitor navigation.
Often the normal state or range of a system w ill vary with the condition 
of the a ircra ft. For example, i f  there has been a generator malfunction, then 
the normal state for the generator bus t ie  relay should be open. Similarly 
during the transfer of fuel, the affected valves and pumps should be open and 
on, respectively.
Factors which are external to the aircraft such as weather or terrain may 
also have an a ffect upon the normal state. Bad weather often ca lls  for 
increased safety margins. In gusty winds or suspected wind-shear, i t  is  
normal to increase airspeed when maneuvering close to  the ground. Braking on 
a wet runway w ill not provide the same deceleration as a dry runway. A wet 
runway w ill have a considerable a ffect upon V-j (c r it ic a l  engine fa ilure 
speed), which may a ffect the recommended procedures during the loss o f an 
engine on takeoff r o ll .
2 .2 .2 Diagnosis o f  Probable Cause
Often a malfunction w ill cause several sensors to indicate a deviation. 
It  is  therefore essential to isolate  the cause from the symptoms. A simple 
example o f diagnosis with multiple sensor indications is an engine flamecut 
caused by a malfunctioning fuel boost pump. Within a short span o f time, the 
monitor should detect fuel pressure low, RPM low, EGT low, EPR low, associated
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generator output o f f ,  and low hydraulic pressure on the associated system. A 
conventional system would provide the p ilo t with every sensor indication and 
depend upon the p ilo t  and his experience to analyze the data and draw the 
proper conclusion.
The following method for diagnosis uses the cause-effect net shown in 
Figure 1. The cause-effect net would be represented in the computer with 
directional links between the nodes [2,31 Failure o f the number 2 boost pump 
with the cross-feed valve closed, w ill cause fuel pressure to  drop, which in 
turn w ill retard fuel flow, which in turn w ill cause combustion to cease. 
Combustion requires the simultaneous and continuous existence o f  not only fuel 
flew, but also air flow and ignition . Without combustion, the engine w ill 
stop running, which w ill cause the number 2 generator and number 2 hydraulic 
pump to fa i l .  I f  the number 2 AC bus is hot because it  is  receiving power 
frem the number 1 generator, and the boost pump switch is on, then there is  an 
inconsistency across the number 2 boost pump node. That is , there is  no fuel 
pressure, even though the pump has e le ctr ica l power. This inconsistency can 
be found from any point in the net that is  affected by the inconsistency by 
backing up the links until the inconsistency is  found. The result o f the 
diagnosis would be presented with a l i s t  o f supporting indications or 
consequences. This type of information w ill particularly help less 
experienced p ilots cope with unusual situations.
2.2 .3 Automatic Checklist
The purpose o f the checklist is  to  insure c r it ic a l actions are not 
forgotten. Human limitations necessitate that the checklist procedures be 
brie f and cover only the rrost important items. Therefore, the omission o f  any
13
Figure 1. Cause e f fe c t  network fo r  part o f an a ircra ft  engine.
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item could result in a hazardous condition. There are two basic types o f 
checklist actions. One is  monitoring and the other is preparation. The 
former is  well handled by the basic monitor. The latter implies more planning 
information.
The preparation for an anticipated maneuver (e .g . landing) may require 
several actions. The script can provide information on what actions need to 
be taken to prepare for a maneuver. The preparations include a ircra ft 
preparation such as lowering the landing gear, but more importantly, p ilo t 
preparation. The p ilo t  would be positively  notified  that a sp ec ific  checklist 
for a portion o f the flig h t  had been successfully completed. For example, 
prior to the approach to landing the display might appear as depicted in 
Figure 2.
APPROACH TO FIELD CHECKLIST COMPLETED -  NORMAL
1. ILS I¥Y 25L to Los Angeles Inti
2. APPROACH SPEED = 140 KTS
3. MINIMUMS: (200 -  1/2) DH = 326' MSL
VERIFY APPROACH AND LANDING CLEARANCE 
Figure 2. Simulated Checklist Display
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This kind o f  information, i f  presented at the proper time, can help to 
keep the p ilo t  ahead o f  the a ircra ft. In order to provide this information at 
the proper time, i t  is  necessary to have flig h t  plan and clearance information 
as well as f l ig h t  scripts to provide timing and synchronization for the 
automatic checklist. I t  should be emphasized that the information in Figure 2 
merely supports the Vertical Situation Display (or the Heads-Up Display) and 
the Horizontal Situation Display which are the primary sources o f information 
during flig h t.
2.3 Knowledge Base Requirements for an Instrument Verification Subsystem
Sensor verification  is  the process o f establishing the log ica l 
consistency among related sensors. The nature o f the consistency w ill depend 
upon the physical constraints o f the sensor being checked. The following 
description o f aircraft parameters indicates how they are related to other 
aircraft parameters. This set o f parameters is incomplete but serves as 
starting point for establishing a complete set o f parameters in the SECURE 
system. The relationships thus established w ill become part o f  the knowledge 
base and w ill allow the respective parameters to be checked for consistency 
with respect to other a ircra ft parameters.
2.3.1 Exhaust gas temperature (EGT)
This is a primary indication o f thrust. A higher EGT w ill normally 
indicate a higher thrust. Related sensors are fuel flow, RPM, EPR (ratio  o f 
turbine pressure to  in let pressure), air temperature, etc. Normally the fuel 
control schedules fuel to the engine based upon throttle position, air
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temperature, RPM, EGT, and compressor discharge pressure. Proper operation of 
the fuel control depends upon correct sensor data. High EGT is  normally 
associated with high fuel flow, high EPR, and usually high RPM. I f  the EGT 
trend were to  follow the other parameters, then the EGT sensor would probably 
be operating properly. I f  a change in EGT were reported without a 
corresponding change in the related parameters, then the EGT sensor would 
probably be in error.
2 .3 .2 Fuel quantity
The quantity of fuel within a particular tank can be checked by 
transferring known quantities o f  fuel into or out o f the tank being checked. 
Also, because the flow rate is  usually known, i t  is  possible to integrate to 
fuel flow over a period o f  time to derive a value by which the quantity should 
change. The indicated quantity of fuel would also be compared against the 
planned quantity frcrn the fl ig h t  plan.
2.3 .3 Hydraulic Pressure
The hydraulic pressure is  a measure o f the performance o f the hydraulic 
pumps. Related sensors include hydraulic flu id  quantity, hydraulic pump rpm, 
flu id  temperature, and accumulator pressure. Sensors which d irectly  report the 
resultant action o f  hydraulic pressure are also necessary. These would include 
flig h t  control surface position indicators, other hydraulically actuated 
mechanism position indicators.
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2.3-4 Inertial Platform
The verification  of this type o f sensor is a problem because it  is  a 
reference standard. While direct verification  of an accelerometer can only be 
done by using redundancy, the resulting position information o f the inertia l 
navigation system can be d irectly  checked by independent means. Similarly, the 
attitude information can be verified  by checking the a irc ra ft ’ s flig h t  
characteristics. For example, i f  the a ircraft is  not wings leve l, i t  w ill tend 
to turn. Pitch can be checked against angle o f attack and airspeed.
2.3*5 Angle o f A ttack/P itot-static inputs
The relationship between the angle o f attack and p ito t-s ta tic  data varies 
as a function o f the forces acting upon the a ircra ft: l i f t ,  drag, weight, and 
thrust. L ift  is  a function o f angle o f attack, airspeed, and configuration. 
Drag also depends on the same parameters. Thrust is  simply the e ffective  
thrust o f  the engines. Weight is  the e ffective  weight o f the a ircraft (takes 
G-loading into account). The angle o f attack and the pi to t-s ta t ic  data can be 
correlated with additional data about the engine thrust, aircraft
acceleration, attitude, and aircraft weight.
2.4 Knowledge Base Requirements for a Display Priority Resolution Subsystem
The problem for the priority  resolution system is  to take a massive 
amount o f raw data and to process it  in real time and produce relevant 
information in a form which is  readily usable. Most information need not be 
presented to the p ilo t , unless sp ecifica lly  requested. In crder to prevent an 
information glut, only essential information should be provided automatically.
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A skilled  p ilo t  is  able to  stay ahead o f  his aircraft by rapid 
interpretation o f his instruments. From practice, he knows where to look and 
also what to expect to see. While conventional instrumentation lends i t s e l f  to 
this type o f interpretation, multipurpose CRT displays do not. The p ilo t 
cannot look at a multipurpose display and know a priori what w ill be there. I t  
could be engine data, navigation data, or even emergency data. There are two 
d istinct interpretations that must be made, f i r s t ,  what the information is  and 
then second, what it  means. I f  the handicap of the f ir s t  interpretation is  to 
be o ffse t , then the quality of the information displayed must be very high. 
Clearly, there is  more to the problem than format and organization factors. 
The next section is  concerned with the content o f the information provided. I f  
the content is  not relevant, then no amount o f formatting or structure w ill 
increase the value of the information.
The priority  of any information frcm the monitor may be variable and 
depend upon the context o f the current situation. The c r it ica lity  of the loss 
o f cabin pressurization depends upon the altitude of the a ircra ft. The loss of 
cabin pressurization at high altitude may be caused by loss o f pneumatic 
pressure for a ir  conditioning, cabin a ir  outflow valve stuck open, or loss o f 
structural in tegrity . It is clear that the loss o f structural integrity of the 
cabin w ill require a descent. However, in the case o f loss o f pneumatic 
pressure, action other than a descent might restore cabin pressurization. I f  
the loss o f cabin pressurization is  caused by a loss o f pneumatic pressure due 
to  an engine malfunction, then the cabin pressure might be most quickly 
recovered by correcting the engine problem. In practice, the p ilo t would 
probably in itia te  a descent while working on the engine. I f  the same problem 
occurred at low altitude, no p ilo t  action would be necessary and accordingly, 
the pressurization fa ilu re would not warrant a high priority . On the other
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hand, some warnings, such as an engine fire  indication, should always have 
high priority .
The c r it ica lity  of a generator malfunction depends upon the operation of 
the other generators and the engines. The fa ilu re o f an engine results in the 
loss o f its  generator. The loss o f the second generator is always more 
c r it ic a l than the loss o f the f i r s t .  For most multi-engine a ircra ft , a single 
generator can supply a l l  essential e le ctr ica l power, but a ll non-essential 
e le ctr ica l equipment must be shutdown to prevent overload and subsequent loss 
o f the single generator. The same reasoning is  likely  to be true of any system 
which re lie s  on redundancy for re lia b ility .
An example o f changing p r ior it ies  can be seen during the normal takeoff 
sequence. Through the very early part o f  the takeoff r o l l ,  any deviation may 
be reported because the a ircra ft would be traveling slowly and would have 
su ffic ien t runway to easily stop. However, during the c r it ic a l phase o f 
takeoff (from about 50 knots until after takeoff is completed), the executive 
should suppress any information that is  not related to takeoff performance 
parameters, such as engine thrust, flig h t  control and flig h t  hydraulics, 
emergency e le ctr ica l power, landing gear and brakes, and the in ertia l 
reference system. The p ilo t should not be distracted with non -critica l 
information during a c r it ic a l phase o f flig h t. The information could be 
provided after the takeoff is completed. Besides, the outright suppression of 
data, any data that is  presented, is  ordered in a priority  ranking so that the 
p ilo t  w ill receive the most c r it ic a l  information f ir s t .  In the case o f 
multiple emergencies, the system would be able to  present up to four 
malfunctions or deviations at once. This would permit the p ilo t  to change the 
order o f priority  as he might deem necessary.
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Because a ll high workload or c r it ic a l  phases o f f l ig h t  are not always the 
same, the aircrew should receive an indication that a low priority  deviation 
has been detected. The indication could be temporarily ignored with reasonable 
confidence, but i f  the p ilo t  or another crew member could afford the time, the 
suppressed information could be called up for display.
2.5 Knowledge Base Requirements for a Planning System
The objective of the plan generator is to provide procedural information 
to permit the p ilo t  to cope with abnormal situations in the safest possible 
manner. This is accomplished by providing the necessary information on a 
timely basis. The normal sequence o f operation for the plan generator would 
start with a signal from the monitor indicating an abnormal condition and a 
diagnosis. The plan generator would then provide a canned plan frcm its  
standard repertoire or generate a new plan. The primary reason for canned 
plans is  to  assure minimum reaction time to abnormal conditions. A canned plan 
might result in the use o f  automatic severity abatement procedures to further 
reduce reaction time under certain well defined situations.
The general guidelines for operation during an abnormal situation applies 
to every situation in any type o f a ircra ft. These rules are as follow s:
1. Maintain aircraft control. This rreans that the priority  of the 
problem should not override the basic "safety of f l ig h t"  rules. 
Aircraft control should not be sacrificed  in an attempt to solve 
a problem.
2. Analyze the situation. The p ilo t  and the monitor must 
co lle ctiv e ly  determine the cause o f  the problem.
3. Take the proper action. The plan generator should come up with a 
sequence o f actions that w ill correct, or at least ameliorate 
the situation . Failing that, i t  might try to generate a plan to 
cope with the situation until a safe landing can be made.
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4. Land as soon as conditions permit.
I t  would be unreasonable to  assume that contingency plans for a l l  
possible deviations could be anticipated, much less programmed. For this 
reason the computer system should possess the capability for generating new 
plans. Plan generators, planners, or problem-solvers might be categorized into 
two broad types. There are the broad problem solvers which seek to find a 
general methodology applicable to  a broad class o f problems. This approach has 
met with rather limited success, which is  not surprising when the nature o f 
the task is examined. An alternate approach using specialized knowledge bases 
has had more demonstrable results. Some leading examples o f specia list systems 
are MYCIN [4 ], DENDRAL [5 ], and MACSYMA [6 ].
The ad_ hoc approach would seem most useful at the present time because 
the a ircraft and the flig h t  domain provide some natural constraints which can 
simplify the plan generation task. The goal is always the same -  to land 
safely at a suitable a ir fie ld . A flig h t  plan and the flig h t  script provide 
short-range goals for the operation o f the a ircra ft. The possible actions 
which can be taken are limited to a fixed, though large set which can be 
controlled, either d irectly  or indirectly , from the cockpit. Many actions, 
such as repairs, are precluded because o f  inaccessib ility  of system components 
during flig h t . Hence, redundancy is commonly used in the design of aircraft 
systems which sim plifies the problem solving task. Another constraint is  that 
many controls are binary -  either a system or function is  ON or OFF. In 
addition, most o f the interactions among the systems of the a ircraft have been 
studied in extreme detail and are well understood. These considerations w ill
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fa c ilita te  the ad hoc plan generator.
An earlier airborne computer system, CADM [7 ], which involved the
generation o f actions to correct abnormal situations was limited in certain 
respects. While CADM was able to  solve a large class o f simulated 
malfunctions, i t  was not sensitive to changes in context during a normal 
flig h t . The CADM error correction procedure was developed by the use o f a 
fixed strategy. CADM assumed that the p ilo t  was always right and did not 
interact constructively with the p ilo t  during the planning stage. Hence, CADM 
could not u tiliz e  the p i lo t ’ s knowledge o f the a ircraft and its  systems, of
procedures, or of high level goals. Finally, i f  CADM fa iled , i t  did not
provide the p ilo t  adequate information about the reasons for fa ilure.
The presence o f the p ilo t  is  also a consideration that must be 
incorporated into the design of an in telligen t airborne computer system. The 
p ilo t , with his experience and training, can be a valuable source o f
information during periods o f abnormal operation. For example, the problem o f 
computer planning in incompletely specified domains [8] has not really been 
solved. The p ilo t  can provide high level guidance to  minimize the possib ility  
of the computer system becoming side-tracked. Pilot inputs could be the 
specification of goals, resolution o f priority , resolution o f con flictin g  
information, or the specification o f current lim itations. While excessive 
p ilo t  dependence is  not desirable, some interaction would be o f mutual value 
to  the p ilo t  and the computer system.
The plan gererator need not be able to solve every problem in minute 
detail. I t  should do an excellent job on most situations, a reasonable job on 
most o f the other jobs, and fa il  only partially on the remaining few problems. 
The concept o f the use o f a partial plan [9 ] emphasizes the need for
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sufficiency rather than detail. It  must be emphasized that a partial plan 
which may not be adequate for computer implementation, nay be overly detailed 
for use by the p ilo t . This is  because the p ilo t has much higher level thought 
than a computer system. A partial plan may also permit additional f le x ib ility  
in a given situation by allowing the p ilo t to interpret the plan as necessary. 
For example, an instruction to increase airspeed may be accomplished by a 
negative change in vertica l velocity, by increasing the engine thrust, by 
changing the configuration, or any corrtoination o f the preceding methods.
Partial plans concentrate on a loca l strategy to revise faulty plans at 
the fa i l  point. This rreans that the part o f  the plan that fa iled  is  analyzed 
to determine and correct the cause o f  fa ilu re  and that, at least temporarily, 
the rest o f  the plan is  preserved. This is usually mere e ff ic ie n t  than 
scraping an unsuccessful plan in its  entirety. Furthermore, the reuse of old 
partial plans can be used by the p ilo t to evaluate the cause o f the plan 
fa ilu re . The p ilo t  or the plan generator could c a ll  for a change in global 
strategy when loca l strategy changes appeared inadequate.
Once a plan is  generated, its  execution could be simulated by using the 
cause-effect net. The simulation may expose a fault in the plan or an 
undesirable s id e -e ffe c t . I f  no unacceptable s id e -e ffects  were detected and the 
plan had the intended e f fe c t ,  then the plan could be implemented by the p ilo t . 
A plan to restart an engine with a fa iled  fuel boost pump could be tested by 
using the net in Figure 1. The simulation would follow the flow o f causality 
and determine i f  the desired goal was attained. I f  the goal was not attained, 
then the net would provide information about where the plan fa iled  by the 
inconsistency across a node mentioned above. The simulation should increase 
the success rate as well as confidence in the plan.
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3 CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF THE SECURE SYSTEM
The design for the SECURE system has begun to  take shape. Its  major 
functions o f monitoring, verifying instrument outputs and planning, using 
knowledge about the a ircraft system, flig h t  dynamics and flig h t  phases have 
been defined. The overall organization of SECURE is  shown in Figure 3. The 
dashed lines indicate data transfers, and the solid lines indicate control 
paths. Conceptually the Instrument Verification System (IVS) and the Script 
Based Monitor (SBM) operate independently. The SBM accesses the knowledge base 
to  determine the a ircraft status, to determine whether a system is  functioning 
properly and to determine where the aircraft should be. It  enters new data 
into the knowledge base about the nature o f fa ilures and deviations it 
discovers. In addition, i t  can c a ll for plans to be made for recovery from 
various fa ilu re  modes.
In a similar manner the instrurrent verification  system uses knowledge 
about aircraft systems and instruments to check the consistency arrong the 
outputs o f various instruments. Inconsistency reports are passed to the SBM 
and are added to the knowledge base as part o f  the flig h t  history. The IVS can 
also request a plan to be made for diagnosing a probable cause of 
inconsistency.
The Fault Recovery Planner (FRP) is  evoked by the IVS and the SBM to 
generate plans for recovering from system faults and for operating in degraded 
mode. These plans are not automatically effected , but at an opportune time are 
presented to the p ilo t  as suggestions which he may u tilize  or re je ct . The FRP 
draws on the knowledge base for information about a ll phases o f the flig h t , 
the fl ig h t  history, the functioning o f  systems, weather conditions, possible
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Figure 3. Organization o f the SECURE system.
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landing s ite s , and generally u tilizes  information which w ill allow i t  to make 
plans which the p ilo t  can accept.
Finally, the aircraft simulator allows the a ircraft status vector to be 
manipulated in order to derronstrate the operation o f the SECURE system.
Communication with the p ilo t occurs through the Priority Resolution 
System (PRS). The relationship o f the PRS to SECURE is  shown in Figure 4. The 
PRS presents information to the p ilo t  about the aircraft status, instrument or 
system fa ilu res, and i t  presents suggested recovery procedures generated by 
the planner. It  has the added function o f determining when and how much 
unsolicited information should be presented to the p ilo t . This it  decides on 
the basis o f the knowledge it  has o f flig h t  procedures and the current phase 
o f the flig h t, the p ilo t  can always request sp ec ific  information to be 
displayed in addition to more detailed information about what the PRS is  
displaying.
The a ircra ft simulator, and portions o f the SECURE system have been 
implemented. In particular, part o f  the IVS has been written to determine the 
consistency o f the navigation instruments which compute the a ircra ft location. 
Also the scripts o f a l l  phases o f the flig h t  have been implemented and allcw 
the determination o f  whether various conditions are normal. For instance, the 
SBM determines that it  is  normal for the landing gear to be down during the 
landing phase. The knowledge base structure is  s t i l l  evolving and currently 
exists in parts o f the IVS and SBM.
Section 3.1 describes the types o f information and some of its  
representations which w ill comprise the knowledge base. Section 3.2 discusses 
the current implementation of the instrument verification  system and Section
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Figure 4. Relationship between P riority  Resolution System and SECURE.
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3.3 discusses the current implementation o f the script based monitor. Finally, 
section 3.4 discusses the a ircraft simulator which has been implemented.
3.1 The Knowledge Base
The contents o f the knowledge base for the SECURE system is  summarized in 
Figure 5. The items for which sp ec ific  information should be maintained is  
listed  in the le f t  hand column. Each o f  the SECURE systems which accesses the 
knowledge base is  listed  at the top o f the figure, and the sp ec ific  knowledge 
required by these systems is indicated by the check marks.
Although the knowledge base has not been implemented as an identifiable 
subsection o f the SECURE system, we are attempting to organize the types o f 
knowledge so that this is  possible. The problem being worked on is  that o f how 
to represent the information so that it  is  generally accessible by more than 
one system. Since, for instance, the SBM, the IVS, and the FRP a ll  must obtain 
information about aircraft navigation systems, there shouldn’ t be three 
representations for the same b it o f information unless something is  to be 
gained by doing so. For instance, a single cause-effect network similar to 
that o f Figure 1, which w ill describe a l l  the relationships o f a functioning 
engine on a high level, would allow both the IVS and the FRP to do reasoning 
about the engine system.
Large portions o f the knowledge base w ill be concerned with procedures 
and factual information such as VOR transmitter locations, checklist 
procedures, basic fault recovery procedure, and a history o f the fl ig h t  in the 
form o f periodic status reports. It is  anticipated that the knowledge base 
w ill evolve into a large part o f  the entire system as the SECURE system
29
USED BY
KNOWLEDGE OF
S
B
M
I
V
S
F
t
P
R
S REPRESENTATIONS
Engine System / /
Cause-Effect
Networks
Procedural
Networks
Electrical System / /
Hydraulic System / /
Pneumatic System / /
Fuel System / /
Flight Control System / /
Instruments / / /
Navigation / / / Tables and Procedures
Flight Phases / / /
ScriptsFlight Procedures / /
Fault Recovery Phases /
Flight Status / / /
Lists
Flight History /V /
Figure 5. Knowledge base requirements fo r  the SECURE system.
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capabilities become more clearly defined.
3-2 The Instrument Verification Subsystem
The purpose o f  the instrument verification  system is  to  determire whether 
the output for any given instrument is  reliab le . In doing so the IVS attempts 
to determine what the output should be with respect to other instrument 
outputs and compares the expected value with the output o f  the instrument in 
question.
The IVS is  designed to r e fle c t  the following considerations. F irst, 
whenever the IVS detects an inconsistency in instrument outputs, i t  should 
attempt to indicate to  the p ilo t  possible sources for the trouble instead o f 
to merely give him a general warning. Secondly, i t  is  not always possible for 
the IVS to  immediately determine whether a change in an instrument output is  
due to a fa ilu re  in the instrument (in  which case the output o f  the instrument 
would be inconsistent with other instruments) or whether it  is  due to a change 
in the state o f an a ircraft system (in which case the output would be 
consistent with those o f the other instruments). This means that a delayed 
observation may be necessary to provide second order information to decide the 
consistency of the instruments. Finally, since it  is  intended that the 
computer help the p ilo t  by reducing his workload, rather than burdening him 
with heavy man-machine communication, a troubleshooting strategy that requires 
p ilo t  cooperation should not be applied unless a l l  other strategies fa i l .
An approach which u tilizes  five  strategies is being investigated as a 
solution to  verifying instrument outputs. The relations among the five 
strategies are shown in Figure 6. Inconsistencies are detected by comparing
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Figure 6. Organization o f the Instrument V erifica tion  System.
different estimates o f f l ig h t  parameter values. When a comparison is  
inconclusive, the verifier  can either use related instruments to confirm the 
consistency of the instruments, or it  can in itia te  a delayed observation to 
co lle c t  extra information. When an inconsistency is noted, the verifier  
attempts to locate faulty instruments with related-instrument confirmation, 
delayed observation, or even with the help of the p ilo t . The following 
discussion describes these strategies and their implementations.
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3.2.1 The Detection o f Inconsistencies from Multiple Instrument Outputs
Parameters indicating a ircraft status (altitude, location, e tc .)  can 
either be read d irectly  from instruments or they can be computed from a 
combination o f  instrument outputs. Advanced aircraft are usually equipped with 
redundant instrumentation, so that one instrument can be checked against the 
others. Thus, a particular parameter may be computed in several d ifferent 
ways, each based on one set o f  instrument outputs. This suggests a 
straightforward strategy to verify instrument outputs. First evaluate each 
formula for the target parameter and compare the results. I f  a l l  o f these 
results agree (within a certain tolerance) with each other, i t  may be assumed 
that a ll related instruments are functioning properly and the result is  
acceptable. On the other hand, i f  the computed results are not in agreement, 
there must be at least one malfunction among the related instruments. An 
attempt is  made to then iso la te  the faulty instrument or instruments.
The example o f Figure 7 illu stra tes the strategy of verifying the 
instruments o f the aircraft navigation system by computing the aircraft 
location frcm each set o f  instruments and comparing these results. I f  a ll  the 
results agree with each other, the conclusion is  that the navigation systems 
are functioning properly. Otherwise the inconsistencies are noted and an 
attempt is  made to determine the faulty instrument or instruments.
3.2 .2 The Isolation o f Faulty Instruments by Reasoning
In verifying instrument outputs, the IVS should give a real-time response 
i f  possible. Therefore, any computation and check-up that can be done without 
further observation should be performed f i r s t .  For instance, one way of
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Figure 7. The detection o f inconsistencies using d ifferen t sources.
indicating the faulty instrument is  to analyze those source instruments which 
contribute to  the inconsistent results and to issue a candidate l i s t  o f
possibly faulty instruments, ordered by their relative chance o f occurrence. 
I f  this fa i ls  to  give a confident answer (or fa ils  to locate the faulty 
instrument during diagnosis), further information may s t i l l  be obtained
through diagnoses which rely on the delayed observations o f certain
parameters, may require delays o f several seconds before the faulty instrument 
is  located and should only be used as a last resort with the p i lo t ’ s 
knowledge.
AIRCRAFT
LOCATION
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( T )  Co n s is t e n t  w ith  ( ? )
( T )  I n c o n s is t e n t  w ith  ( T )  and ( 2)
Figure 8. Fault iso la tion  by source data analysis.
An approach to determining faulty instruments is  to  endow the IVS with a 
"reasoning" capability. An example o f the type o f reasoning possible is  
illustrated by Figure 8. Assume the a ircra ft has the following following 
navigation instruments: INS, V0R1 , V0R2 and DME1. I f  the location reading from 
INS is  consistent with the location computed from V0R1 and V0R2, while the 
computed result from V0R1 and DME1 is  not consistent with the other 
computations, the IVS w ill conclude that DME1 is  probably faulty.
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3.2.3 Confirmation by Related Instruments
Some instrument outputs may not contribute d irectly  to the computation o f 
a parametric value, but can s t i l l  provide evidence to  support or re ject the 
values which have been computed from other instrument outputs. While 
consistent confirmation fran the supporting evidence increases the liklihood 
o f  correctly deciding that the instruments in question are functioning 
properly, an inconsistent report is  also useful because it  can help in 
isolating instrument fau lts.
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The example illustrated by Figure 9 shows an a ircraft with two VOR’ s and 
one ADF. Although a single ADF reading cannot lead to an independent 
estimation o f location for comparing with the result computed from two VOR’ s, 
the Verifier can use the ADF reading to confirm the rea ilt  from the VOR’ s.
3.2.4 The Collection o f Time Related Information
The verification  of parameters based on a snapshot o f the system status 
is not always possible, because their relations may be dominated by second 
order e ffe c ts . To verify such parameters, the IVS should have the ab ility  to 
relate a series o f observations and make a decision about the consistency o f 
instrument outputs at some time (perhaps a few seconds) after an indication o f 
trouble has been noted.
Figure 10 illu stra tes the condition when the EGT indication is  not 
consistent with that o f the EPR. This situation may be caused by an engine 
flame-out (EGT low) while the EPR-reading fa ils  to re fle c t  the situation. Or 
the situation may be caused by a defective EGT sensor that triggered the 
flame-out report. One possible way out o f  this d ifficu lty  is  to  make a delayed 
observation on N2’ s rpm reading since N2 w ill change slowly because o f the 
rotation momentum o f the engine turbine. In this example, N2 drops after a 
time delay, fin a lly  confirming the flame-out situation and consequently 
establishing the consistency o f the EGT indication.
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Figure 10. A delayed observation o f N2 to confirm an engine fa ilu re .
3.2.5 Diagnosis by Experimentation
After the system has done everything i t  can to verify the instrument
outputs without modifying the aircraft status and is  s t i l l  uncertain about the
result, there is  one more step it  can try. I t  can in itia te  an experiment on
the a ircraft control and watch for it s  response. Such an experiment should be
%
sanctioned by the p ilo t , or should be performed with the cooperation of the 
p ilo t . This approach has been arranged as a final backup step because the 
p i lo t ’ s attention must be diverted, which can add to his workload.
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Figure 11. Instrument v e r ifica t io n  by experimentation.
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Figure 11 shows an interactive sequence in which the IVS asks the p ilo t 
to increase the throttle to  check the Fuel Flow (FF) indicator.
3.2.6 The Implementation o f the Instrument Verification System
During the second quarter, work was started on the coding o f  the 
Instrument Verification System. This work focussed on the implementation of 
the section which detects inconsistencies in the estimated parameter values. 
The ab ility  to perform this function depends on knowledge of the a ircra ft, its  
systems and its  instruments. In addition, the determination of consistency 
depends on the ab ility  to propagate tolerance ranges through a computation. 
The parts o f the knowledge base which have been implemented are discussed in 
the following.
3.2.6.1 Knowledge about Flight Parameters
This is the general knowledge about fligh t-con tro l parameters that one 
may learn from flig h t  textbooks. For example, to find the aircraft location, 
the following strategies, which are found in the DC-10 manuals, may be applied 
[ 10, 11]:
1. Read LATITUDE and LONGITUDE from the Inertial Navigation System.
2. Compute location from 2 VOR-readings.
3. Compute location from VOR- and DME-readings.
4. Compute location from 2 ADF-readings.
5. Estimate by "Dead-reckoning".
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This knowledge is  organized in a LISP property-list under the name 
"LOCATION" and the property "T0-FIND":
(»LOCATION ((READ-INSTRUMENT INS/LOC) 
( L0C-FR0M-V0 R1+V0R2) 
(L0C-FR0M-V0R1+DME1)
(LOC-FROM-ADF1+ADF2 )
( LOC-FROM-DEAD-RECKONING)
)
»TO-FIND)
With this representation, knowledge that relates each fl ig h t  parameter to a 
unique set o f  instruments is  modularly stored into the knowledge base.
3 .2 .6 .2  Knowledge about Flight Instruments
This is  the kind o f  knowledge found in a flig h t  instrument manual:
VOR
READING-RANGE: 0 -  360 degrees 
ACCURACY : + 1 degree 
T0-0PERATE : power-on RMI
power-on VOR-RECEIVER 
function-select/RMI VOR 
f  req-s elect/VO R-RECEIVER
(dialed frequency on VOR-receiver)
Again, th is knowledge is  stored into the knowledge base in the form o f a LISP 
property-list:
(»VOR (0 : 360 degrees) ’ READING-RANGE)
( ’VOR (+ 1  degree) ’ ACCURACY)
( 'VOR (AND ( POWER RMI ON)
(POWER VOR-RECEIVER ON)
(FUNCTION-SELECT RMI VOR) 
(FREQUENCY-SELECT VOR-RECEIVER
7STATI0N-FREQUENCY)
)
’ TO-OPERATE)
3.2 .6 .3  Knowledge about Ground Navigation Stations
This is  the kind o f information that is  found in the Aerodrome fa c ility  
directory. Such knowledge is  represented in LISP as a l i s t  o f  N-tuples:
VOR-STATIONS
((NAME . CMI)
(LOCATION . ((N 40 02 04) (W 88 16 34))) 
(FREQUENCY . 110.0)
(CHANNEL . 37)
)
( . . .
[L0WER-BODND1 UPPER-BOUND  ^ [LOWER-BOUND,, UPPER-BOUND,, ]
RESULT [ TOLERANCE ]
DATA SOURCE
Figure 12. Propagation o f tolerance ranges.
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3.2 .6 .4  Tolerance Propagation
I t  is  often d ifficu lt  to determina, based on single-valued results, 
whether two estimations o f a parameter are consistent with each other because 
instruments and sensors are subject to bu ilt-in  errors. Such errors should be 
accounted for during computation by propagating them toward the fin a l results. 
Figure 12 illustra tes the format for a data representation which sp ecifies  a 
normal value within a certain tolerance range. A set o f  tolerance propagating 
operators, called the TP-operators, which combine and propagate data with its  
tolerance attachment, were implemented.
The LISP forms to represent values with tolerance attachments are as 
follows:
LISP-form meaning
(X (XL XU)) X with lower-lim it XL and 
upper-limit XU
(X «  P)) = (X (X-X*P% X+X*P%))
(x (+ rao) = (X (X-DX X+DX))
X (X (X X)) or (X (% 0))
(X (?  XU)) X with unknown lower-limit
(X (XL ? )) X with unknown upper-limit
(X (? ? ) ) X with unknown upper and lower limits
(X (% ? ) ) =(X (?  ? ) )
? =(? (? ? ))  indefin ite data
The above forms are designed to provide a convenient user interface. The 
TP-operators log ica lly  propagate the indefinite "? " , and the result o f 
evaluating each formula for a given parameter is  a set o f  values with their
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respective tolerances. Two rea ilts  are then said to be consistent i f  there is  
a comrrDn value in the tolerance ranges o f both results.
Figure 13 illustra tes a scheme for determining the a ircra ft location by 
using d ifferent combinations o f instrument systems. The navigation systems 
available in th is example are assumed to be V0R1, V0R2, DME1, ADF1, ADF2. The 
tolerances for the VOR-readings are within 1 degree o f accuracy, for the 
ADF-readings, 3 degrees, and for the DME-readings approximately 1 % o f the 
tota l indicated distance. At least three estimations o f the current location 
can be computed from these instrument readings and their corresponding 
tolerances as is illustrated in Figures 14-16. The consistency of these 
navigation instruments is  decided from the tolerance-ranges o f results.
3.3 The Script Based Monitor
The function o f the oomputer monitor is to  continuously observe the 
flig h t  environment and evaluate the situation for possible errors that would 
threaten the safety of the flig h t . The use o f a computer monitor can 
sign ificantly  reduce the p ilo t  workload by relieving the p ilo t  o f  the tedious 
task of monitoring numerous instrument readings and mentally integrating the 
raw data to determine the overall system performance. The computer monitor 
would be especially useful during periods o f high workload when the p i lo t 's  
attention is  at a premium. Another advantage o f the computer monitor is  that 
the rronitor would not be affected by typical human fa ilin gs such as boredom, 
fatigue, or fixation .
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Figure 13. Three schemes fo r  determining the a ircra ft  location .
Result;
Tolerance Radius 2 .6N.M.
EON ~ (N 41 16 10)
(W 87 47 28)
(N 40 02 04) 
(W88 16 34)
Figure 14. A ircra ft location  computed from VORI and V0R2.
45
( N 40 29) 
(W 88 56)
Figure 15. A ircra ft location  computed from ADF1 and ADF2.
Result:
1 x 1.5 N.M. SQ
Figure 16. A ircra ft location  computed from VORI and DME1.
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We have completed a study o f the desired attributes o f a computer monitor 
[1 ], and have determined them to be the following:
1. Verification o f instrument readings.
2. Detection o f  instrument reading deviations.
3. Diagnosis o f a common cause for related deviations.
4. Report o f  appropriate deviations and/or diagnosis to  the p ilo t .
5. Automatic checklist presentation.
6. Generation o f  a history o f deviations and significant events for 
later analysis.
The monitor’ s awareness o f the fl ig h t  environment requires the measurement o f 
a l l  sign ificant aircraft parameters via sensors. The instrument readings are 
verified  for log ica l consistency. The verified instrument readings are 
compared against a context sensitive model for agreement. A diagnosis is  made 
based upon the deviations to determine i f  there is  a probable common cause. 
Any diagnosis and its  supporting evidence are reported to the p ilo t  when 
appropriate and are recorded for later analysis.
The crux o f the detection o f deviations lie s  in the determination of the 
normal state o f the a ircra ft , which requires an awareness o f the flig h t 
context. There seem to be two types o f context in the flig h t  domain. One type 
o f context is  a phase-based context which is  o f a temporal nature. The 
phase-based context reflects  the highly regular characteristics o f  the flig h t  
as can be seen in Figure 17* For example, i t  can be expected that the takeoff 
r o ll  phase follows the taxiing phase and precedes the clirrb phase. The 
phase-based context is  reflected in the crew checklist where different modes 
are specified for different phases o f flig h t . The other type o f context is  a 
condition-based context. Often the normal state o f  the aircraft or the normal
Takeoff--------------------------- —► Cruise------------------------------ ►- Landing
F P - 6 0 7 3
Figure 17. A three lev e l p r o f ile  o f a f l ig h t .
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procedure for the fl ig h t  w ill change with the occurrence of an event that may 
be either internal or external to the airplane. For example, i f  there has been 
a generator malfunction, then the normal state for the bus-tie relay should be 
open. Also when flying under gusty wind conditions, i t  is  normal to increase 
the airspeed when maneuvering close to  the ground.
It  is  important for the monitor to be aware o f the phase-based context 
since this context defines a normal flig h t . We have designed a data structure 
called "scrip t" to  hold the information that describes the various phases o f a 
fl ig h t  [12]. A script is  defined below:
<script> ::= ( <name>
<entry ccndition>
<next scrip ts>
<normal states>
<ranked concerns>
<checklist>
<procedure-scripts> )
<name>::= the script name.
<entry ccndition>: := key system parameters that signal this
context.
<next scrip ts>::= possible next contexts.
Cnormal states>: := the normal state o f  the a ircra ft. This is  the
context sensitive model.
<ranked concerns>::= ordered system parameters used for co n flic t  
and priority resolution.
<checklist> ::= ex p lic it  checklist i f  available.
<procedure-scripts>::=<script>*, also the sequence o f  contexts
that make up this script. The <script>* 
also decomposes into actions.
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The script is  a tree structure. At the top, the context description is  
vague. The context description becomes more precise as we progress down the 
tree. The script is  also a recursive data structure. The <procedure-scripts> 
nonterminal o f  a given script may be composed o f  a sequence o f  scripts, vfoich 
make up a more precise description o f the present scrip t. Thus, each context, 
represented by a script structure, may be decomposed into a sequence o f  more 
finely  detailed contexts also represented by scripts. The top level script is  
shown in Figure 18 and contains only the pointers to its  three descendant 
scrip ts. One of its  descendants, the takeoff phase, looks like Figure 19. The 
Takeoff-s script is  necessarily vague since the takeoff phase covers a 
multitude of contexts.
(FLIGHT-S NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL 
NIL
(TAKEOFF-S CRUISE-S LANDING-S))
Figure 18. The Top Level Script
(TAKEOFF-S (FUEL = MAX
ALT = 0 -> LOW)
(CRUISE-S)
(FUEL = MAX 
THRUST = 0 -> MAX 
ALT = 0 -> LOW 
GEAR = DOWN)
NIL
NIL
(START-ENGINE-S TAXIING-S 
TAKEOFF-ROLL-S CLIMB-1-S 
CLIMB-2-S))
Figure 19. A Second Level Script
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The twelve third level scripts shown in Figure 17 have been implemented. 
Only the <entry ccndition>, <next scripts> and <normal state> fie ld s  o f  these 
scripts have been implemented in detail. The <checklist> and <ranked concerns> 
fie ld s  have been implemented for some of the scrip ts. The preliminary monitor 
tracks the context transitions and the script transitions, and detects errors 
in a context sensitive fashion [3,13,14].
The condition-based context is  to be implemented through event-action 
rules. These rules w ill implement the irregular, though frequently occurring, 
events that either alter the normal state of the aircraft or the normal 
procedure for the flig h t . Examples o f such rules are the following:
1. generator malfunction -> bus tie  relay open.
2. gusty wind condition -> increased airspeed when maneuvering 
close to  the ground.
The emergency procedures for the a ircra ft can be implemented through these 
event-action rules. A data base o f the emergency procedures and other flig h t 
knowledge should prove to be very useful.
The preliminary monitor system consists o f the modules shown in Figure 
20. The system presently consists o f four programs running concurrently under 
time-sharing. The system environment is  described by a state vector that 
describes the a irc ra ft ’ s internal systems and its  tra jectory in 3-D space. The 
state vector manager updates the vector and sends out the state vector to the 
monitor and the display program. The display program outputs the pertinent 
state vector entries on a terminal screen so that the human observer can 
determine the present flig h t  environment. The monitor periodically scans the 
state vector and checks for context transitions and system errors as defined 
by the scripts in the script data base. The fault insertion program causes
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- - - - - - > CONTROL PATH
-- - - - - - »DATA PATH
Figure 20. Block diagram of the run time system.
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faults in the system by altering the state vector. Presently, the flig h t  
environment is  updated by the fault insertion program. An aircraft simulator 
has been completed, but it  is  not linked to the system yet. A ll communications 
to the state vector manager are routed through the IPCF fa c ility  in the 
TCPS-10 operating system for the CSL PDP-10 computer.
In the next quarter, we plan to  implement the event-action rules for the 
condition-based contexts. The sufficiency of the script structure w ill be 
investigated. The cause-effect structures necessary for a more general 
computer monitor w ill also be investigated.
3.4 The Aircraft Simulator
In order to evaluate the verification  and monitoring strategies being 
developed for the SECURE system, i t  is  necessary to have a test bed in which 
to try these ideas. The a ircra ft simulator fu l f i l l s  th is function. The 
simulator was designed to allow for the following:
1. It  must simulate relevant aircraft systems but avoid excessive 
detail.
2. I t  must be easy to implement.
3. I t  must be easy to modify.
4. I t  must be modularized.
5. I t  must allow faults to  be introduced into the a ircra ft.
Since the simulator is intended to act as a test bed for the SECURE 
system, i t  should be capable o f simulating a l l  the a ircra ft systems with which 
the SECURE system w ill have to in teract, but at the same time it  should avoid 
superfluous detail. Thus a simple aerodynamic model is appropriate but a
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simulation o f  a galley e le c tr ica l system is  not. As the SECURE system evolves, 
its  test bed w ill have to  evolve also. Thus ease o f modification and 
modularity are important. Since the main purpose of the SECURE system is  to 
aid the p ilo t  when the aircraft is  not functioning properly, the simulator 
should be able to  simulate faults in the aircraft systems.
Figure 21 shows the basic structure o f the simulator. The p ilo t  inputs to  
the simulator via the standard controls, elevator, aileron etc. The state 
variables re fle c t  the simulator's view of the current state o f the a ircra ft, 
that is , its  position, speed, fuel quantity, etc. The Dynanics procedures are 
used to update the state variables. Sensors provide a mechanism for SECURE and 
the p ilo t  to view the state o f the a ircra ft. It  should be noted that the 
sensors and the state variables may disagree i f  a sensor fault has been 
introduced into the simulator. The experimenter has two inputs to the 
simulator. He may cause any aircraft system to appear to have fa iled . He may 
also modify any variable in the simulator.
The simulator is  roughly that o f a three engine commercial je t .  The major 
a ct iv it ie s  o f the simulator thus far center around maintaining the a ircra ft 's  
position, speed and attitude via a simple aerodynamic model. The aircraft 
systems which are currently being simulated are summarized below:
1. Flight system
controls -  aileron, elevator, flaps, speed brake
attitude -  pitch, bank
speed -  air speed, rate o f  clinrb
altitude -  radio altimeter, barometric altimeter
2. Navigation system
in srtia l nav. -  latitude, longitude, heading 
radio nav. -  VOR, DME
3. Engine system
thrust
fuel -  fuel flow, fuel quantity
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Set
Initial
State
Set
Fault
Pilot
Knowledge
Base
r P - 6074
Figure 21. Diagram o f the a ircra ft  simulator.
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4. Miscellaneous
landing gear 
time
Faults are introduced into the simulator by breaking the update path to 
certain variables in the simulator. These variables w ill remain at their 
current value unless changed by the action o f the experimenter. For example, a 
flamecut o f the number one engine is  introduced by fa ilin g  the variable 
VTHRUST1 and then setting VTHRUST1 to zero. Similarly, the fa ilu re  o f the 
barometric altimeter is accomplished by fa ilin g  the sensor variable SBARALT 
and then setting SBARALT to an erroneous value.
During the next quarter, we plan to link the simulator to the other 
programs in the in te lligen t monitoring system. In addition, the simulator w ill 
be expanded to include a more detailed simulation of some o f the internal 
systems of the a ircra ft.
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4 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE PLANS
The f ir s t  h a lf year o f this project has seen considerable progress in the 
developrrent o f  the conceptual framework of the SECURE system. Of the six tasks 
specified in the contract, the f ir s t  two are nearly completed. Several 
interviews were conducted with flig h t  crew numbers to determire the tasks 
which the computer w ill perform and the results o f this study is being written 
in a separate report. In addition, most o f the information to  be included in 
the knowledge base has been established and some of it  has been implemented as 
oarts o f the various software subsystems. Task 3, to  design a planning system 
has begun and w ill be continued during the second half o f the year. Finally, 
Task 4 has been started with the coding o f parts o f the instrums nt 
verification  system, the script based monitor and an a ircraft simulator which 
communicates with the IVS and the SBM. Work w ill continue during the next six 
months with the development o f the concepts o f the SECURE system and the 
implementation o f  these concepts. Plans are currently being formulated for the 
system derronstration which w ill be given toward the end o f  the contracting 
period.
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